Characteristics and predictability of companies' acquisitions
Empirical Evidence from Denmark 1
1993-1996 A B S T R A C T
The purpose of this paper is to derive and test several hypotheses on the characteristics of Danish acquisitions during the period from 1993 to 1996, and to try to estimate a statistical model for prediction of acquisition targets. We use binary and multinomial logit models, with variables expressed on firm and industry level. The sample covers a broad cross section of firms of different sizes and in different industries. In the period from 1993 to 1996 our results characterize targets as poor performing and financially distressed units when compared to their industry average, and to the control group of non merging companies. The findings are in support of the inefficient management hypothesis and to the more general view that acquisitions can serve as the managerial discipline device. These findings shed also some lights on the possibility of considering mergers and acquisitions as an alternative for bankruptcy avoidance. Acquirers are identified as companies in need for growth opportunities and better profitability. The models are tested for prediction accuracy on a holdout sample of firms in year 1997.
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Introduction
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First it investigates the characteristics of targets and acquiring companies and second it estimates a likelihood model for prediction of acquisition targets. The research is conducted on a n unbalanced panel of 16776 companies in Denmark, in the period from 1993 to 1996. At first glance by identifying characteristics of take-over targets one can test different theories of why take-over occurs. Second, likelihood models can help us to predict take-over activity in a given period of time (Nuttal 1999) . To study the characteristics of targets and acquirers, we use a binomial logit analysis and test the hypotheses, some of which based on economic theory, using proxies variables expressed on firm and industry level. We further test the prediction accuracy of the models on a holdout sample of firms that were acquired in 1997 and not included in the period of estimation. One advantage of this study is that it includes a broad cross section of firms of different sizes and in different industries and identifies characteristics for both target and acquirers compared to non-merging firms 2 .
The rest of the paper is comprised of the following sections. Section 2 reviews the literature, the hypothesis, the empirical model, and the sampling methodology. Section 3 shows the general trends and the descriptive statistics of our data. The results of the empirical estimation are presented in section 4. Section 5 includes the test for prediction and the sensitivity analysis of the predicted probabilities. Section 6 presents a brief conclusion.
Characteristics of acquisitions
Literature Review Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) use logit analysis to identify the characteristics of merger targets over a sample of US firms from 1969 to 1973. They find sales turnover, size, leverage and trading volume, as statistically significant variables in affecting the likelihood of a firm to become a merger target. Palepu (1986) employs logit analysis to investigate the usefulness of six acquisition hypotheses also frequently cited in the financial literature 3 . He uses a sample of firms belonging to the manufacturing and mining sector in the US, during the period 1971 -1979 . Palepu (1986 finds that firm with inefficient management, low growth, low leverage and small size have higher likelihood in becoming take-over targets. On a large sample from 1974 -1980 for the manufacturing sector in the U.S. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1992) find that initial plant level of productivity is inversely related to subsequent plant turnover. Kim and Arbel (1998) investigate firms in the hospitality industry. In contrary to previous studies, they find that firm size is positively related to the likelihood of becoming a target. A combination of low growth and high liquidity or high growth and low liquidity is found to be a characteristic of targets companies. High ratios of capital expenditures to a firm's assets and low ratios of price to book values of firms' stock also increase their likelihood of becoming targets. Dahya and Powell (1998) find that hostile takeovers target have lower profitability, higher debt and lower abnormal returns compared to friendly ones. Nuttal (1999) studies a sample of 643 UK quoted companies in the period from 1989 to 1996. The author finds that the probability of a takeover increases with increase in a firm's leverage and decreases with the increase of a firm's profitability, size and age. In
Barnes (2000) we find that firms with low level of profitability combined with poor sales growth are more likely target candidates. Cudd and Duggal (2000) follow the Palepu (1986) procedure and in addition they include industry-specific distributional characteristics while using financial ratios. They use a sample including firm in the manufacturing sector of companies listed either on the American Stock Exchange or the New York Stock Exchange, during the 1987-91 period. Cudd and Duggal (2000) results are consistent with the hypothesis of inefficient management, growth, leverage and size.
They also find that firms operating in industries where a merger has occurred in the prior 12 month were more likely target candidates.
The Hypotheses
There is wide body of literature exploring the mergers and acquisitions motives; (see Agrawal and Jeffe (2002) , Meschi (1997) and Trautwein (1990) for a review) seen by the lens of the neo-classical economic theory, a cquisitions motives like market power, economies of scale and scope, cost efficiencies, synergies, and replacement of inefficient management of the target firm, would follow under the umbrella of profit maximization behavior (Meschi 1997 However managers of potential targets might act in a non-value maximization behavior and might be seen as inefficient from the viewpoint of the potential buyers. Therefore takeover could be seen instead as a managerial discipline device to remove bed manager from low performing firms. This view would predict targets as poor performing firms where acquirers could replace management and subsequently improve targets profitability.
Empire building theory would predict that managers acquire firms to maximize their own expected utility instead of fully maximizing the owner or shareholders interests. This hypothesis originates from work of Marris (1963) and subsequently by Mueller (1969) who developed the growth maximization hypothesis to partially explain the causes of mergers. The high premium paid for acquisitions could also be explained by the overconfidence of management in turning the acquired company in a better performer.
The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers Roll (1986) would explain why takeover bids made even when the valuation of the target firm above the market price. Roll (1986) argues the acquirers commit a valuation error, implying that firms 'infected by hubris simply pay too much for their targets' (Roll 1986 page 197) . Mork, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) present evidence of a systematic overpayment for acquisitions. They justify the evidence by referring to Roll (1986) hubris hypothesis and to managerial personal objectives of the bidding firms.
Following the above discussion, in the following paragraphs we will articulate more in details the set of hypothesis that we will try to test in the remaining part of our paper.
Firm Size
The firm size can have a negative relationship with respect to the likelihood of an acquisition. As argued in Douglas (1975) there might be two main explanations for this hypothesis. First large firms would face fewer potential riders than small firms, and second large companies might involve higher commitment for integrating the target into the rider structure. Smaller-sized firms decrease the acquisition costs and are easy to acquire (Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984) . Larger firms might have sufficient resources to engage in costly takeover defense (Cudd and Duggal 2000) . Therefore we would expect that keeping other things constants the smaller the firm the larger the likelihood of an acquisition. On the other hand to the extent that agency problems are more severe in large firms where the ownership control is weaker one could expect large companies to underperform and thus become more attractive takeover targets (Nuttal, 1999) . Marris (1963) explain that from cross section studies there is evidence that the 'best way to obtain a large salary is to become the president of a large corporation' (page 187). Mueller (1969) investigate the growth maximization hypothesis and assumes that managers use present value approach for decision rule. According to Mueller (1969) the growth maximization hypothesis would predict that growth maximization management will calculate the present value of the investment with a lower discount rate than a manager under the stockholder maximization approach. The implication of this hypothesis could explain the large size of acquisitions but also the miscalculation on the expected future benefits.
The merger activity in the 1980s in the US compared to those of other periods was mainly characterized by the large size of targets (Barnes, 2000) . If management acts in concordance with the growth-maximization behavior, than managers shall prefer larger rather than smaller acquisitions (Barnes 2000). The variables: total sales, number of employees and total assets are used for firm size and considering the two arguments from the theory, it is expected that they can carry a negative or positive sign in the logit model.
Inefficient Management
Mergers and acquisitions can be considered as mechanism that aims to transfers resources from inefficient managers to efficient ones (see Agrawal and Jaffe 2002 for a review).
Manne (1964) on the cause of takeover attempt argues that very attractive acquisitions are more likely to be those of companies showing a low stock price relative to what it could be with more efficient management. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1992) define an acquisition could be seen as mechanism to correct for lapses in efficiency. According to the theory lapses in efficiency can be corrected by replacing the inefficient management of the target firm. If efficiency and profitability are correlated than this action should cause an increase a firm's profitability in the long run. Therefore following the theory firms with inefficient management are likely to become merger targets (Palepu, 1986) .
The variables used to assess management performance are profit margins and asset turnover, relative to their industry mean or median, and are expected to carry a negative sign in the logit model.
Financial Leverage
The likelihood of becoming an acquisition target decreases with the increase in the company debt (Palepu, 1986) . A potential acquirer could see low debt ratios, as the inability of the management of maximizing the firm value. Therefore if control is gained over the firm from the acquirer an increase of debt could be used to improve the firm value since the firm could acquire additional assets and from those generate extra value.
Low debt rations can reduce the risk of default and also the increase the debt capability of a joint firm (Palepu, 1986) . The variables used to test this hypothesis are the ratio of longterm debt to total assets and long-term debt to equity and are expected to carry a negative sign in the logit model. The variables are expressed as distance to their industry median. Nuttal (1999) Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) show that deregulation and oil prices shocks also partially explain the takeover activity of the 1980s, indeed mergers occur in waves and strongly cluster by industry. In order to partially control for these effects we introduce industry dummies specific for the manufacturing and service sectors 6 .
Firm Age

Bankruptcy hypothesis
Dewey ( Shrieves and Donald (1979) found evidence in support of the bankruptcy avoidance hypothesis as a rationale for mergers. They conclude that many cases of severe financial crises among large firms, 'are resolved through the merger process', and if this process does contribute to the efficient reallocation of resources from less to more productive parts, than mergers represent a valuably function in the economy. Several studies on European data have been able to support the bankruptcy theory of takeovers using premerger profitability of the acquired firms (Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987) . These argumentations lead us to investigate the bankruptcy literature 7 and the use of financial ratios in bankruptcy predictions. Altman work is pivotal in the use of financial variables for bankruptcy predictions. Altman (1968) develop a statistical model using variables expressed as financial ratios and identifies statistically significant differences among bankruptcy firms and non. The variables: earnings before interest and taxes to total assets, sales to total assets, and market equity value to total assets, are found to be predictor for companies ' bankruptcy. Zmijewski (1984) uses three set of variables to in his bankruptcy study: net income to total assets, total liabilities to total assets and current assets to current liabilities. Over a sample from 1962 to 1983 the author concludes that net income to total assets and total liabilities to total assets are good predictor for firms' bankruptcy. Schumway (2001) uses Altman's variables using both discrimiant and hazard models to predict firms' bankruptcy. The author concludes that firms with higher earning relative to assets, and larger firms with low level of liabilities are less likely to fail for bankruptcy 8 .
Altman looks also at 'external' factors influencing a company's propensity to fail. The author hypothesis, empirically supported, are that macroeconomic factors as tight money supply, low economic growth, and poor stock performance are all significant elements affecting a firm's propensity to fail. Therefore companies already operating in difficulties are very likely to be highly and negatively affected by credit squeeze or an economic downturn. Atman suggests that companies finding themselves in the above category should be looking a merger as one the possible alternatives.
Based on the above discussion, if we assume that firms with higher ratio of debt to total assets, lower level of profit to sales and lower sales to assets are more likely to fail for bankruptcy, than we can test the hypothesis that the decision of firms owners to sell can be explained as the only alternative to avoid bankruptcy. In this setting takeover might be considered as good mechanism to conserve value and avoid costly bankruptcies procedures. Financial leverage is expected to carry a positive sign in the logit model while profit margin and asset turnover are expected to carry negative sings. There is however a theoretical link among the inefficient management, leverage and bankruptcy hypothesis. Inefficient management might be the cause a company's financial distress, which will turn in company failure and bankruptcy; this might happen at the beginning of a company life.
Other hypothesis found in the literature
In the literature authors often include the Market-to-Book (MTB) and Price-Earning (P/E) hypothesis. The Market-to-book hypothesis is also known as the under-valuation hypothesis, where firms with low market-to-book ratios are estimated as unevaluated and therefore as an attractive target. The Price-earning hypothesis implies that high P/E ratios tend to increase expected acquisition costs of the target firm and reduce the likelihood of mergers (Dietrich and Sorensen 1984) . MTB and P/E variables would be expected to carry a negative sign in the logit model. Nevertheless in Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) , Palepu (1986) and Cudd and Duggal (2000) , these variables have not been found statistically significant in affecting the likelihood of a firm being a merger target.
Anyway due to lack of data the above two hypotheses cannot be tested in models. In the next table we summarize our discussion on the hypothesis formulation and their test variables. 
Theoretical background of the empirical model
Based on neoclassical economic theory, we assume that the decision maker has a set of finite C alternatives (choices) and is able to assign a value called utility to each alternative Bierlaire (1997). In our model we assume the two alternatives: M (merge) and NM (not merge), and that the decision maker selects the alternative associated with the highest utility. In our case the decision maker is the firm (or the owner).
Neoclassical economic theory assumes that the decision maker has a perfect discrimination capability. But since we do not have perfect information, we need to incorporate uncertainty in our utility function. Formally we have:
Where U is the utility associated with each choice and X is a vector representing firm level characteristics, and is the deterministic component of the utility, while e represent the stochastic part.
We assume that a company will merge if the difference between the utility of merging and non-merging is bigger than zero.
If we denote by y = 1 the owner's choice (or company's choice) to sell (or merge), than the probability of choice M given the exogenous firms characteristics X i , is equal to the 
In the empirical model we assumes that the form of F, the cumulative distribution of e i , is logistic. Therefore following Maddala (1985) one has:
Empirical Estimation
Consider the cumulative probability P of an event E expressed as follows (Gujarati, 1995) :
Where Y = is dichotomous and take values of 1 or 0. P is the probability of the event conditional upon the vector X, which contains firm characteristics, while α and β are the parameters to be estimated. Equation (1) is known as the cumulative logistic distribution function (Gujarati, 1995) . From equation (1) we specify the two equations for the logit models used in the analysis:
Target and non
Model 1:
Acquirers and non Model 2: L 2 = ln(P /( 1-P)) = α + βΧ (3)
Where in model 1, (P it /1-P it ), is the ratio of the probability that a firm will be an acquisition target to the probability that a firm will not (odds ratio). In model 2, (P it /1-P it ), is the ratio of the probability that a firm will be an acquirer over the probability that a firm will be a non-acquiring one. X is a vector containing several explanatory variables coming from a firm's and industry characteristic and partially expressed as a financial ratios. We assume that the logit link function is correct, that the relation between the logit of the independents and the dependent is linear, the models are correctly or reasonably specified, and that the error terms are independent, implying that the acquisition probability for a given firm is independent of the acquisition probability of an other firm in the sample. Stated differently one could think that the increase in firm i probability given a decrease i.e. in profit margin will not affect the probability of firm j to become an acquisition target.
One could also speculate on the choice of using the logit model instead of probit or a liner discriminant model. As explained in Maddala (1983) since the cumulative normal distribution and the logistic distribution are very close to each other, except for the tails, probit and logit models are not likely to produce very different results given large samples. On the differences between the logit and the linear discriminant analysis, Maddala (1983) e xplains that if the independent variables are not normal, the discriminant analysis estimator given by the ordinary least squares (OLS) procedure becomes not consistent whereas the logit maximum-likelihood estimator (MLE) is consistent and more robust. On the other hand if the dependent variables are normally distributed the discriminant analysis estimator from the OLS procedure is the true maximum-likelihood estimator and therefore is asymptotically more efficient than the (MLE) in the logit model.
Sampling methodologies
Most of previous studies use a sample of target firms as fixed, while for the non-targets firms the methodologies vary across authors. Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) , and Sorensen In order to have enough observations in the 'acquired company' category we decided to include all the number observations with exception of those for which data is not available. We use the same procedure for the non-targets. Cudd and Duggal (2000) use the weighted approach in their logit model by considering the proportion of the population of un-acquired firms included in their sample. Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) , Kim and Arbel (1998) carry out logit analyses for prediction of acquisition target using random sample data but they do not consider the problem of disproportionate sampling. Maddala (1992) comments that weighting the observation is a correct procedure if one is in presence of heteroscedasticity. Maddala (1992) argues that the unequal sampling procedure does not necessarily cause the heteroskedasticity problem 10 , therefore by using the normal logit model 'the coefficients are not affected by the unequal sampling rates for the two groups.' 11 10 See Maddala (1992) Introduction to Econometrics page 331, and Maddala (1983) Limited-dependent and qualitative variables in econometrics, page 90 for a deeper treatment of the subject. 11 In fact is only the constant term that is affected. If the model should be used only to detect which variables are significant no further changes are needed. If instead the model should be used for prediction one should correct the value of the constant term, α. Maddala (1982 and 1992) describe the procedure for this correction. The constant term α is decreased by the difference between the natural logarithm of the proportions of observation chosen from the two groups, y = 1 and 0, respectively. So one has: α -(ln p 1 -ln p 2 ). Tables 3 to 6 In 1996 we observe 10% of acquisition in diversified industries compared to 4% in 1993.
General Trends
For the horizontal type values show a small decrease from 80% in 1993 to 75% in 1996.
The vertical type of acquisition increased in 1995 to 13%, from 7% in 1993, but in 1996 the value has returned to the 1993 level. The industry characteristics for targets are quite stable across the sample period with a constant and d ominant activity in the manufacturing sector between 42-50% of the total number of acquisitions.
Insert table3, 4 and 5 here Sample data
The data set used in this study is constructed from public accounts of Danish firms over the period 1993 to 1996. The data come from a private company (Købmandsstandens Oplysningsbureau A/S) and are based on firm-specific information derived from the firms' legal obligation to submit accounting reports to the authorities. From the publication Fusioner made available from the Konkurrence Rådet Authority, we are able to select in the period 1993-1996 a sample of a total of 167 acquisitions and for which data is available, while a total 16583 non-targets and non acquiring firms were used for comparison; this give a total sample of 16750 firms. It was checked that the firms that were not target in the sample period were not target in the two years after. If a firm if found to be acquired in 1993 than it is clear that the observation period for that firm is 1993 and the firm is compared with a control group of firms in the same year. The nontargets were divided in 4 approximately equal random samples. Each random sample was used for one of the 4 years of data estimation. The samples were affected randomly to the year of selection.
The sample of takeover targets represent a little above 10% of the actual acquisitions in
Denmark from 1993 to 1996 (KonkurrenceRådet, 1993 (KonkurrenceRådet, -1996 . In terms of revenues, and industry distributions, the selected sample generally does not differ very much from the 'reference sample' over the four year average. In the study sample the average employees variable is 20% bigger than the average of the whole sample.
Insert table 6 here Validation
We use 1997 as the year of our holdout sample where are able to select given data availability a total of 53 acquired companies and 1644 non acquired companies as 1997.
This holdout sample is not part of the main estimation sample, whose model is used for the prediction exercise. However as 53 companies represent almost one third of the total sample we employ for our estimation (167) so we decide just for extra validation purposes to test a full model with the 1997 sample included. This gives us a total sample of 220 targets. If our results are time invariant and robust we should not expect much variation between the two estimations (1993-1996, and 1993-1997) . We refer the reader to the estimation section for the results and precisely to table 9 models 6 and 7.
Sample descriptive statistics
The variables used in the descriptive statistics are specified as three main categories: lag values, three years averages and as growth in the past two and three years prior to the observation period (year of acquisition). Table 7 summarizes the descriptive statistics of our data.
Insert table 7 here
The 'average' acquiring firm in our sample has an average profit margin (profit/sales during the last 3 years prior to merger) of 6.4% compared to 2.2% of the 'average' target firm and 4.5% of the 'average' of non-acquires and non targets (control group). As a first intuition one could argue that target firms might have high cost structures that trigger down their margins. The hypothesis that is born out form this observation and in line with the literature (see Palepu 1984) , is that acquiring firms could see targets firms as not efficiently managed in terms of costs control. Acquirers expect their own management more efficient and able to improve cost efficiency in the target firm. Firms in the control group show growth in revenues of 12.1% in the two years prior to the merger. This value is apparently higher than both the acquiring and the target firms. In fact targets' revenues in the 2 before the merger grew by 10.4%, while acquirers' growth, for the same variables was of 8.6%. Still targets grew more than acquirers, hypothetically due to special niche strategies or to the development and launch of new products in the market.
Asset Turnover (Sales/Average Total Assets) is around 1.6 for both the acquiring and target firms while is 1.9 for the non-target firms. The inefficient management hypothesis would predict that targets have a low asset turnover due to inability of current management to generate sales growth after having undertaken heavy investment (Kim and Arbel 2000). Acquiring firms financed 70% of their assets by debts while target firms used 79% and non-target 76%. One hypothesis presented in the literature is that targets have high debt capacity still unused and therefore the firm value might not be maximized (Stultz 1988) . On the other hand is a firm has a high gearing will also have less possibility of borrowing extra founds since banks will demand guarantees on the firms assets. Those firms might have the only choice for continuing their business if they lack cash, by being acquired by other companies. One year before the acquisition non-merging firms have, a ROA approximately of 7.1% targets of 2.1% and acquirers of 3.8%.
Acquiring firms are bigger than the targets and the control group of non merging companies, if measured by total assets, revenues and number of employees.
Results
Targets and Non Merging Companies
The parameter estimates of five the logit acquisition models and the standard errors are 
-Insert table 8 hereInefficient Management & Company Performance
The variable 'Asset Turnover' expressed in Model 1,2,3 and 4 is statistically significant and carry the expected negative signs indicating that the likelihood of becoming an acquisition target increases due to inefficient management. This is can be explained by the inability of the management to generate revenues from their past investments expressed by the ratio of sales over total assets. Dummy for negative margin is also statistically significant in all six models. Firms with negative margins might operate with higher cost structure when compared with non-targets firms. This can motivate management from the acquirer firms to buy the target company with the expectation of restructuring its organization and generate profits. Asset Turnover expressed as a growth variable in model 5 and 6, is not statistically significant. The findings are in line with Nuttal (1999) who finds underperforming companies as more likely to become takeover target. The hypothesis of inefficient management finds empirical support also when we will introduce, indeed more correctly, industry adjusted values. We refer the reader to the preferred models in table 10.
Market Share
In model 1, 2, 3 and 4, market share is found statistically significant expressed as a oneyear lag and three-year average. The coefficients carry a negative sign indicating that the less is the market share of firm and the more likely it becomes a takeover target. Growth in Market Share is not a significant variable in affecting the likelihood of a firm in becoming an acquisition target, as shown in model 5 and 6.
Size
The variable total revenue (natural logarithm) is statistically significant in all six models and it carries a positive sign. Thus the positive sign is in contradiction with the size hypothesis often mentioned in the literature as in Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) and Palepu (1986) but in line with the finding of Kim and Arbel (1998) the growth maximization theory in Barnes (2000) and the agency problem Nuttal (1999) . It seems that in our sample merger bidders prefer relatively large firms that can fit better their merger motives such as economies of scales and increased market share. This factor could be explained that other studies consider mainly big firms while our sample includes also small and medium sized enterprises.
Leverage
In all models, except model 2, the ratio Debt/Assets is statistically significant different from zero and carries a positive sign. Firms with high Debt/Assets ratio are more likely to be selected as mergers target. This is consistent with the financial distress motive for takeovers. Nuttal (1999) on the UK sample, find that takeover likelihood is greater for companies with high leverage. Firm with high ratios might also have difficulty to borrow extra cash and this might put them in a situation where they become more vulnerable to takeover activity. In contrast Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) and Palepu (1986) found the variable leverage defined as debt to equity ratio, as statistically significant and with a negative sign concluding that firms with higher debt capacity would be more likely to become takeover target.
Bankruptcy Hypothesis
High leverage, low profit margins and low asset turnover are found to be statistically significant characteristics of takeover targets. Assuming that these factors could be characteristic of companies with high risk of bankruptcy, than one can infer on the support of the theory of mergers and takeovers as a common alternative to bankruptcy (Dewey 1960 , Manne 1965 , Shrieves and Donald 1979 , Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987 .
Takeovers save firms and therefore can be considered as a good mechanism in preserving companies' value 13 .
Minimum Efficient Scale
The minimum efficient scale variable (MES) carries a negative sign and is statistically significant in Model 1,2,3 and 4. This can be interpreted as: the lower the barrier to entry in one industry the higher the likelihood that a firm will become a merger target. Growth in MES instead has not a significant effect in the likelihood model (model 5 and 6).
Industry Dummy
The industry dummy equals 1 if a firm operates in the manufacturing sector and equal to 0 if it does not, meaning that it could belong in any of the other sector of the Danish economy. The dummy is significant in all models. The evidence shows that firms belonging to the manufacturing sector are more likely to be a takeover target compared to non-merging firms. Indeed we observed by the descriptive frequencies that 44.7% of targets belong to the manufacturing sector against 17.3% of the non-merging firms. We also tested a model with all with a dummy for each of the sectors of the manufacturing industry and find that companies belonging to the food, glass, metal, machinery, electronic, and furniture industries have a higher likelihood of becoming merger targets 14 .
The cluster of merger activity in the manufacturing sector could be explained by several factors like industry shocks due to technological innovations, deregulation and more competition. One other of the possible explanations could be that if motive of mergers are 13 The models with the introduction of interaction effects among the explanatory variables were not significant and therefore are not reported.
14 The results have shown that the most of the coefficient were of almost the same magnitude; therefore I decided to include all the sectors in only one dummy variable for the manufacturing industries.
mainly driven by economies of scale we are more likely to see this activity in manufacturing industries (i.e. establishing one production plant instead of two, one logistic center instead of two). I also estimated several models by including variables as 'distance from and industry benchmark' expressed as average and median. The models did not show any significant results and therefore I decided to do not include them in the paper 15 .
Given the superior explanatory power of the lag models, we continue our analysis, and new estimations including industry adjusted variables expressed as on one year lag value.
The results are presented in a more digestible way in the next section and are indicated as 'preferred models' that will play a central role in our prediction exercise. Tables 9 and 10 show the result of preferred models. We decide to drop some of the variables that were not statistically significant in the general models, and include models with the use industry adjusted variables. The scope is twofold; firstly, some of our preferred models will be used for prediction purposes, secondly industry adjusted measures will enable us to better test the inefficiency management hypothesis and capture industry variation in our broad sample. The models are initially estimated on a sample of targets and non over the 1993-1996 periods. As we intent to further use the models for prediction purposes we use on dataset for model building and one for model testing. A total of 53 targets in 1997 and a random sample of 1644 non targets (as in year 1997) represent our initial holdout sample that does not take part in the initial estimation.
Preferred Models
Turning to the results we can observe in table 9 that most of coefficients are statistically significant and carry the expected sign. The number of explanatory variables is the same for model 1 and model 2; the main difference is on the Profit Margin Variable. In Model 1 it is entered as a dummy equal to 1 if a firm has shown a negative profit margin in the year prior to the acquisition. In model 2 profit margins enter as the ratio of profit to sales 15 The industry classification at four digit level resulted in very few observation in each cluster with a lag of one year. Model 3 is similar to model 1 with exception for one explanatory variable since the model includes also the natural log of firm age. Model 4 is a variation of model 2 including age and revenues squared as additional variables. The latter variable is included to capture the effect that acquirers can buy target of a bigger size but until a threshold level. Indeed the coefficient of the variable 'revenue squared shows a negative sign and inversely related to the likelihood of a firm in becoming a takeover target. Given the characteristics of our sample of non target where we find firms with 1 employee or above 25000, we decided to estimate a model where the sample is truncated and only firms with employees above 1, and below 8000 are used. This is showed in the Model 5 the last column of the The only variable that turns to be not significant is the minimum efficiency scale. We estimate a new model (7) excluding the minimum efficiency scale variable and including the debt/asset ratio variable lagged one year. The latter turn to be statistically significant different from zero and showing a positive sign. The higher the level of debt over total assets the higher is the likelihood for a company to become a takeover target. For the reaming part of the model the coefficients are almost of the same degree of magnitude and their signs are also unchanged. Therefore our overall conclusion remains unchanged.
Turning to table 10 we present the estimation for the industry adjusted models. The idea is to better capture the industry variation within our sample. The independents variables are expressed as distance the industry median at four digit level. We can observe that the industry adjusted profit margin has the expected sing but turn to be not significant. Size and leverage and asset turnover are significant and show the expected sings. Companies with asset turnover and leverage above the industry median are less likely to be takeovers targets. The evidence helps us to strengthen our argument in favor of the inefficient management hypothesis. The squared term for firm leverage is negative but not significant. The sign of the coefficient would make sense since one would expect a function with a decreasing trend. Firms with size above industry margin have a higher likelihood of being taken over. The squared term for size is negative but not significant.
Therefore the conclusions reached using the likelihood models remain unchanged even when we account 'in a certain degree' for industry variation of the explanatory factors.
Insert table 9 and 10 here Logit analysis and Characteristics of Acquirers
Sorensen (2000) analyses a sample of the acquiring firms during 1996 from Mergerstat Review (1997) and for comparison the author select a matched sample of non-merging company in the same SIC industry code. Sorensen (2000) finds that acquiring firms tend to be more profitable than both targets and non-merging firms and concludes in support for the hypothesis that acquiring firms are usually successful businesses seeking growth by external acquisition. In the following tables we show the results of our analysis on the characteristics of acquiring companies (buyers).
Insert table 11 and 12 here
Looking at table 11 t he Chi square-test shows that there is statistically significant difference between the simple model (only with constant) and the full model. The full model represents an improvement over the model including only the constant term. The logit regression presents an R 2 of 29.1%. The variables: size (log of revenues) has a positive sign indicating that the likelihood of firms in becoming an acquirer is positively related to its size. Asset turnover and profit margin are also statistically significant carrying negative signs. Firms that are unable to generate high asset turnover and profit margin are more likely to proceed in take-over activities compared to non-merging ones, since investing money in an acquisition could generate economies of scale and scope, prices increases and therefore leading them to better level of profitability. The industry dummy and the year dummies show no effect in this model indeed are not statistically significant. We run the models also taking into account industry variation as for the sample of target and non-targets (table 12) . The results shows that company's profit margin, and asset turnover relative to their industry median, are significant variable in affecting the likelihood of a company in engaging into an acquisition. Leverage has a negative sing but is not significant. It is interesting to note that while leverage showed a positive significant sign into the target models, here i t shows a negative but not significant sign. A negative sign implies that higher debt ratio would decrease the likelihood of a company in engaging into an acquisition. This would have been a very likely result since a company with used debt capacity will be very unlikely to borrow extra money to finance an acquisition. Summarizing from the industry adjusted results, the likelihood in entering into an acquisition (becoming a buyer) increase if a company has lower asset turnover, larger size, and lower profit margin compared to its industry median.
We perform an exercise of lumping together targets acquirers and non as three different categories and estimate the model by multinomial logit analysis. The results from the estimation are very similar to the binomial model. An interesting change from the multinomial specification is that while for the targets the results are quite unchanged, for the acquirers group profitability turn not to be a significant discriminatory factor.
Insert table 13
However our conclusion from both the binomial and multinomial analysis is that we tend mainly to identify targets and acquirers as in need of growth opportunity and of improving margin. However we tend to believe that targets are mainly financially distressed companies with probably a more serious treat of bankruptcy. Selling the company might be the preferred alternative to the possibilities of liquidation and bankruptcy.
Prediction Tests for Targets
The Model
The goal of this section is to test the logit models' ability to predict acquisition targets in 1997. For this exercise we use one the estimation from the reduced/preferred models. The firms used for prediction were not part of the sample used for model estimation so to minimize the chance of biased results. The model nr. 4 from table 9 is used for the estimation as we believe it represents theoretically the best model in explaining the acquisition likelihood. We also try to keep variables in continuous terms as we believe they can give a more accurate probability when we insert the value of the dependent variable for each firm. If we take the dummy for profit margin, its coefficient will be multiplied by one if the firm has a negative profit or zero if not. In this case we just have a 'level' difference, whereas with a continuous variable we can plug the value of the profit margin and the product with its estimated parameter will be individual or specific to each firm. With the dummy variable we lump all firms with negative margin in the same pool.
Where LNROMS_1= natural log of real revenues one year lag; ASST_1 = asset turnover one year lag; MES_1 = minimum efficient scale one year lag; DMMAR_1 = dummy equal 1 for negative margin one year lag and equal 0 otherwise; DMAN = dummy equal 1 for manufacturing sector and equal to 0 if otherwise; MAR_1 = profit margin one year lag; LNAGE = natural log of firm's age. In each model we insert values of the holdout sample (1997) in order to calculate the probability for the firm i, at time t = 1997 being an acquisition target. To calculate the probability one convert the log odds ratio so that:
Odds i97 = exp (L i97 ) and P i97 = Odds i97 /(1+Odds i97 )
Cut-off probability Methodology
Following the work of Palepu (1986) , in order to establish if a firm is classified as target or non-target we calculate a cut-off probability. If a given firm has a predicted probability bigger than the cut-off level, it will be classified as target. If the predicted probability is lower than the cut-off level than the firm will be classified as non-target. Palepu (1986) argued that model whose prediction results were based on an arbitrary cut-off-probability (say 0.5) were not precise and lead to misleading results. Palepu (1986 p. 14) assuming equal expected cost of type I and type II errors, explains that an optimal classification should imply that a firm i is classified as a target (acquired) if the marginal probability of observing the probability of acquisition for the firm i, if actually is an acquired firm (f 1 ), should equal or be bigger than marginal probability of classifying the firm as an acquired firm when in reality is an non-acquired firm (f 2 ): Table 14 , on the next pages show the data used for the cut-off probability calculations.
We divide the range of predicted probabilities for each model in ten categories (column 2). For each category we calculate a mid point (mid-value in the table), the number of firms included in the respective range and their proportion relative the total number of firms. This is done for both targets and non-targets (percent T, and percent N in the proportions of targets over the proportion of non-targets for all the ten ranges of probabilities. Our goal is to find the mid point where the ratio of the two proportions (empirical probabilities) is equal to 1. One can observe from the three tables that the value of 1 lies between the first and the second interval for the three models. Using the midpoints of the first and second classification intervals and their corresponding f 1 (p)/f 2 (p) values, by interpolation (Cudd and Duggal, 1998) one can obtain the cut-off probabilities. This can also be seen graphically in Figure 1 , and where the cut-off point is represented by the point where the two density functions intersect.
Insert table 14 here
Insert figure 1 here
All the firms whose predicted probabilities fall above the cut-off point are classified as targets and those whose predicted probabilities fall below as non-targets. Our models
give prediction accuracy for the targets of 64.7% and non targets of 64.6% as is shown in .
Insert table 15 here Sensitivity Change in Predicted Probabilities
In this section it is showed how the changes in values in our dependent variables affect the probability for a firm becoming an acquisition target. We decided to define a 'reference firm' for comparison purposes, mainly based on some general assumptions coming from the observation of our data (i.e. 'Danish average firm'). We than changed systematically the values of the explanatory variables and observed the change in probability from the 'reference firm'. Model 4 from table 9 is used for the estimation.
The following table shows the characteristics of the reference firm for model used in the analysis, whose value based on the median values of the explanatory variables. Table 17 shows the change in probability. 16 The cut-off probability calculation are based on the work of Palepu (1986) and Cudd and Duggal (2000) Insert tables 17
Insert table 16 here
From row 1 to 6 in the table, we change one variable at the time by keeping the remaining variables constant. In row 7, we change both the Revenues and the Ln Age variables while in row 8 we set the Dummy for manufacturing equal to zero and set the Margin and Asset turnover as in row 4 and 5. Starting by the first row the probability for the 'reference firm' for becoming a target is 0.125%. The probability increases to 0.182% if we decrease the ln of age by 50%. Bigger changes in the magnitude of the probability are found when the reference firm experiences a log of sales increase by 50%, indeed the probability of becoming a target changes to circa 10%. If the barrier to entry becomes higher, i.e. by increasing the minimum efficiency scale variables by 50%, the probability of becoming a target goes down to 0.034%. A firm with an increase of 100% in profit margin will have a probability of becoming a target of 0.12% (row 5). If the reference firm operates outside the manufacturing sector the probability deceases to 0.055%. If we combine row 1 and 2, so to have a younger and bigger firm the probability of becoming a target will equal to circa 14.2% (row 7). If we replicate the exercise for row 4 and 5 setting row 6 equal to zero, we get a probability of 0.0146%. Looking at the result of this simple simulation exercise we can observe that a firm's acquisition probability is very sensitive to changes in a ge and size and whether or not the firm operates in the manufacturing sector. The results can also be illustrated graphically where we report the estimates of probabilities by changing the revenues and age variables. The results are showed respectively in the figure 2 and 3. Figure 4 and 5 shows the estimates for model 7.
Insert figures 2, 3, 4 and 5 here
In figure 2 we can observe the effect of the quadratic term in our model. The curve represents a parabola with probability first increasing by increasing of the log of sales and than decreasing at the point where the log of sales equal 12. Figure 3 shows the increasing trend of the acquisition probabilities by decreasing natural log of age. The figures 4 and 5 show similar curves.
Conclusion
The results from the logit analysis show the evidence that in Denmark, inefficient management, size, age, leverage and barrier to entry are all significant hypothesis in defining the characteristics of acquisition targets. When used for prediction of acquisition targets for the year 1997, the model presents accuracy of 84%. Some of the results are in line with those found in the academic literature (Dietrich and Sorensen (1984), Palepu (1986) , Kim and Arbel 1998, Cudd and Duggal 2000) . We tend to identify targets as poor performing and financially distressed companies, while acquirers seem to be in need of growth opportunities and better profitability. There is however a more general and implicit conclusion that can be proposed from the study, and that takeover might be a good mechanism to avoid firm bankruptcy helping to preserve targets firms' value, avoiding the costly procedures of bankruptcy. 
